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Abstract. In this paper we discuss Liau’s logic of Belief, Inform and
Trust (BIT), which captures the use of trust to infer beliefs from ac-
quired information. However, the logic does not capture the derivation
of trust from other notions. We therefore suggest the following two ex-
tensions. First, like Liau we observe that trust in information from an
agent depends on the topic of the information. We extend BIT with a
formalization of topics which are used to infer trust in a proposition
from trust in another proposition, if both propositions have the same
topics. Second, for many applications, communication primitives other
than inform are required. We extend BIT with questions, and discuss
the relationship with belief, inform and trust. An answer to a question
can lead to trust, when the answer conforms to the beliefs of the agent.
1 Introduction
Trustisanissuewhichemergesinmanysubareasofartificialintelligence,inparticular
inmultiagent systems, reputation systems, e-institutions, and electronic commerce
[1]. Liau [2] proposes an elegant, simple, but expressive modal logic as an extension
of multi-agent epistemic logic. The three main ingredients are modal operators for
belief (B), inform (I), and trust (T ). The central axiom expresses that if an agent
trusts another agentwith respect to a proposition, and it has been informed by that
agent that the proposition is true, then it believes that proposition.
The logic explains the consequences of trust, but it does not explain where trust
comes from. The only optional axiom discussed by Liau that derives positive trust
formulas is so-called transferability, which says that trust in one agent can lead to
trust in another agent with respect to the same proposition. In this paper, we study
two other ways in which trust can be derived. We do this by first enriching Liau’s
frameworkwith topics andquestions, and thenby investigating the following issues.
1. How to use topics to infer trust? Like Liau we observe that trust in in-
formation depends on the topic of the information. We extend BIT with a
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formalization of topics. Topics can be used to infer trust in a proposition
from trust in another proposition, if both propositions have the same topics.
2. How to use communication to infer trust? For many applications, commu-
nication primitives other than inform are required. We extend BIT with
questions and discuss the relationship with belief, inform and trust. An an-
swer to a question can also lead to trust, when an agent tests another agent
by questioning him and the answer conforms to the beliefs of the agent.
Weformalizetopicsandquestionsintermsofnon-normalmodaloperators.Toobtain
a simple axiomatization of our semantically defined operatorswe re-formalize them
intermsofoperatorsfromnormalmodallogicusingatechniqueknownassimulation.
Moreover, Liau uses a non-normal modal logic to formalize trust, i.e., his notion of
trust is not closed under tautologies, nor under conjunction nor implication: agent
i does not necessarily trust that , trust that ϕ ∧ ψ does not imply trust that ϕ,
and validity ofϕ ⊃ ψ does not entail that trust thatϕ implies trust thatψ. In order
to work in a uniform and simple framework we also simulate the non-normal trust
operator, using a combination of normal modal logic operators. The reductions or
simulations use the fact that “normal modal logics can simulate all others” [3, 4].
The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the running
example. In Section 3 we repeat and discuss Liau’s BIT logic, and we formalize
the running example in it. In Section 4 and 5 we introduce topics and questions,
as well as the principles permitting to infer trust that can be based on them.
2 Running Example
We use the following example to motivate and illustrate our extensions of Liau’s
logic.
Agent i wants to know the interest rate, which is of vital importance for
his portfolio management. He has found three web-services s1, s2 and s3 that
present financial information, but he does not know whether they deliver up to
date information, or whether the information is correct at all. In other words,
agent i does not know which web-service to trust. Suppose agent i knows the
latest exchange rates for the euro against the dollar, and asks the web-services
about this piece of information. If they do not provide the correct information,
then the agent concludes that the web-services are not trustworthy. Otherwise,
if they supply the correct exchange rate, then the agent trusts them with respect
to financial information. Thus he then knows whom to ask about the interest
rate, in order to use this piece of information in his portfolio management.1
1 We assume that the web-service is not a strategic player, in the sense of Goffman’s
strategic interaction [5], that is, we assume that the web-service does not have some-
thing to gain by making you believe that it is trustworthy but not being so. In
this sense this example is less complex than issues around trust found in electronic
commerce.
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In this paper, we ignore the dynamics and time aspects2 involved in this
example and discuss the formalization of three aspects of this example.
1. First we express the example in Liau’s BIT logic. What can be said there is
that
– if the agent trusts the web-service, then he believes what he is being
informed about;
– if a web-service has informed the agent about something it believes to
be false, then the agent does not trust the web-service.
2. To relate the question about exchange rates with the question about interest
rates, we introduce the notion of topic. Both exchange and interest rates have
the topic of financial information. So, when the web-service can be trusted on
exchange rates, it can be trusted on the whole topic of financial information,
and therefore it can be trusted on interest rates.
3. Based on the hypothesis that in general agents are not being informed by a
web-service by accident, but are being informed as the result of a question
being submitted to the web-service, we extend the system with a question
operator. An agent can then infer trust in a web-service, in case the web-
service has informed the agent in accordance with the agent’s current beliefs.
3 BIT
In this section we repeat and discuss Liau’s logic BIT [2], and we formalize the
running example in it. Definition 1 presents the language of the basic BIT logic,
where Biϕ is read as ‘agent i believes ϕ’, Iijϕ as ‘agent i acquires information ϕ
from agent j’, and Tijϕ as ‘agent i trusts the judgment of agent j on the truth
of ϕ’. In the rest of this paper, we read Iijϕ as ‘agent i is being informed ϕ by
agent j’ or ‘agent i has been informed ϕ by agent j’. For the purpose of this
paper, these three readings can be regarded as synonymous.
Definition 1 (BIT language). Assume we have n agents and a set Φ0 of
countably many atomic propositions. The well formed formulae of the logic BIT
is the least set containing Φ0 that is closed under the following formation rules:
– if ϕ is a wff, then so are ¬ϕ, Biϕ, Iijϕ and Tijϕ for all 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n, and
– if ϕ and ψ are wffs, then so is ϕ ∨ ψ.
As usual, other classical boolean connectives are defined as abbreviations.
Definition 2 presents the axiomatic system for basic BIT. Beliefs are represented
by a normal KD45 modal operator; inform by a normal KD modal operator, and
trust by a non-normal modal operator.
2 We do not discuss the state transitions based on communication actions such as
inform and question.
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Definition 2 (BIT). The basic BIT logic contains the following axioms and is
closed under the following set of inference rules:
P propositional tautologies
B1 [Biϕ ∧Bi(ϕ ⊃ ψ)] ⊃ Biψ
B2 ¬Bi⊥
B3 Biϕ ⊃ BiBiϕ
B4 ¬Biϕ ⊃ Bi¬Biϕ
I1 [Iijϕ ∧ Iij(ϕ ⊃ ψ)] ⊃ Iijψ
I2 ¬Iij⊥
C1 (BiIijϕ ∧ Tijϕ) ⊃ Biϕ
C2 Tijϕ ⊃ BiTijϕ
R1 (Modus Ponens, MP): from  ϕ and  ϕ ⊃ ψ infer  ψ
R2 (Generalization, Gen): from  ϕ infer  Biϕ and  Iijϕ
R3 from  ϕ ≡ ψ infer  Tijϕ ≡ Tijψ
Liau discusses several possible extensions of the basic BIT logic: additional axiom
C3 is called symmetric trust, C4 is called transferability, C5 is called cautious
trust, and axiom C6 is called the ideal environment assumption.
C3 Tijϕ ⊃ Tij¬ϕ (symmetric trust)
C4 BiTjkϕ ⊃ Tikϕ (transferability)
C5 Tijϕ ⊃ Bi[(Iijϕ ⊃ Bjϕ) ∧ (Bjϕ ⊃ ϕ)] (cautious trust)
C6 Iijϕ ≡ BiIijϕ (ideal environment)
To understand Liau’s logic, first observe that an agent can trust another agent,
without believing that the other agent is sincere and competent, as in other logics
of trust, see for example [6]. This is expressed by the central axiom (C1), which
is weaker than the inference from a combination of sincerity Iijϕ ⊃ Bjϕ and
competence Bjϕ ⊃ ϕ by the trusted agent, which are the respective constituents
of cautious trust in C5.
Secondly, observe that the logic is focussed on the formalization of conse-
quences of trust, not on how trust is derived. That is, axiom C1 characterizes
how trust in a proposition may lead to a belief in that proposition (in case of
an inform), but little is said about the derivation of trust. Axiom C3 relates
trust in a proposition to trust in its negation, and axiom C4 derives trust in an
agent from trust in another agent. There are no axioms that derive trust from
an inform, or that relate trust in a proposition to trust in another proposition,
except for the negation in C3.
Thirdly, it shouldbeobservedthatthe fact thatthetrustoperator isnon-normal,
means that using axiom C1 we can derive Biϕ from BiIij(ϕ ∧ ψ) and Tijϕ, but we
cannot derive Biϕ from BiIijϕ and Tij(ϕ∧ψ). There are good reasons for this, for
whichwe refer toLiau’s paper. Liau presents the following standard semantics for
his logic. We do not mention the semantic constraints for the additional C3-C6.
Definition 3 (Semantics BIT). A BIT model is a tuple
〈W,π, (Bi)1≤i≤n, (Iij)1≤i=j≤n, (Tij)1≤i=j≤n〉
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where W is a set of possible worlds, π : Φ0 → 2W is a truth assignment mapping
each atomic proposition to the set of worlds in which it is true, (Bi)1≤i≤n ⊆
W×W are serial, transitive and Euclidian binary relations on W , (Iij)1≤i=j≤n ⊆
W ×W are serial binary relations on W , and (Tij)1≤i=j≤n are binary relations
between W and the power set of W . Moreover, the satisfaction relation is defined
as follows.
1. M,w |= p iff w ∈ π(p)
2. M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w |= ϕ
3. M,w |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ or M,w |= ψ
4. M,w |= Biϕ iff for all u ∈ Bi(w), M,u |= ϕ
5. M,w |= Iijϕ iff for all u ∈ Iij(w), M,u |= ϕ
6. M,w |= Tijϕ iff |ϕ| = {u ∈ W | M,u |= ϕ} ∈ Tij(w),
where |ϕ| is called the truth set of ϕ.
The corresponding constraints for axioms C1 and C2 are:
m1 For all S ∈ Tij(w), if (Bi ◦ Iij)(w) ⊆ S, then Bi(w) ⊆ S, where ‘◦’ denotes
the composition operator between two binary operations;
m2 Tij(w) = ∩u∈Bi(w)Tij(u).
The logic may seem relatively simple, but – although Liau does not discuss
such applications – we can already use the logic to reason about relatively com-
plex phenomena such as trust in the ignorance of agents Tij(¬Bjϕ∧¬Bj¬ϕ) or
some aspects of trusted third parties (BiIijTjkϕ ∧ TijTjkϕ) ⊃ Tikϕ.
The following example formalizes some aspects of the running example.
Example 1. Assume a finite set of atomic propositions i(0.0), . . . , i(10.0) denot-
ing interest rates, and a finite set of atomic propositions e(0.50), . . . , e(2.00)
denoting exchange rates, where the interval and step size are chosen arbitrarily.
Moreover, let the set of agents be {i, s1, s2, s3}. From axiom C1, by contra-
position we have the following set of instances, for s ∈ {s1, s2, s3} and r ∈
{0.50, . . . , 2.00}, which states that if an agent i believes that a web-service s has
informed him about an exchange rate which i does not believe, then agent i will
not trust that web-service.
BiIise(r) ∧ ¬Bie(r) ⊃ ¬Tise(r)
Moreover, axiom C1 also implies the following set of instances, for s ∈ {s1, s2, s3}
and r ∈ {0.0, . . . , 10.0}, which states that if an agent i believes that the web-
service s has informed him about the interest rates, and i trusts s, then agent i
believes the interest rates.
BiIisi(r) ∧ Tisi(r) ⊃ Bii(r)
Finally, if agent i trusts the web-service s with respect to some interest or
exchange rates, then i also trusts s with respect to other rates. This can be
‘hard-coded’ with the following set of assumptions, for s ∈ {s1, s2, s3}, r1, r3 ∈
{i(0.0), . . . , i(10.0)} and r2, r4 ∈ {e(0.50), . . . , e(2.00)}.
Tisi(r1) ∨ Tise(r2) ⊃ Tisi(r3) ∧ Tise(r4)
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Hence Liau’s logic already allows to infer new beliefs via trust, and to infer
distrust. What it does not allow is to infer trust, which is what the rest of the
paper is about.
4 Topics
For trust it matters what a formula “is about”: its topic. Agents have a certain
area of expertise or competence. If they are trustworthy on some formulas, then
they are likely to be trustworthy on other formulas that have the same topic.
That will lead to a principle of inference that, for example, trust in one financial
rate implies trust in another financial rate. We formalize a principle of topical
trust. Liau already recognizes the need for topical trust, as his third item for
further research:
“A special case of symmetric trust, called topical trust, is considered
without standard axiomatization. This problem may be remedied by
introducing the topics of propositions into the language. For example,
in a logic of aboutness [7], a sorted binary predicate A(t,‘p’) is used to
denote “sentence ‘p’ is about topic t”. If our BIT language is extended
with such a predicate, then we can formulate axioms as: A(t,‘ϕ’) ⊃
Tijϕ when j is specialized at topic t, or more strongly, as (A(t1,‘ϕ’) ∨
. . . ∨ A(tk,‘ϕ’)) ≡ Tijϕ when the set of topics at which an agent is
specialized are [t1, . . . , tk]. However, further research is needed to see how
the semantics can be changed to accommodate this syntactic extension.”
Our extension of BIT logic with topics is loosely inspired by a proposal of Herzig
and Longin. Whereas Herzig and Longin formalize the notion of topics in the
metalanguage, we will formalize it using standard normal modal operators.
4.1 Herzig and Longin
The conceptual model of Herzig and Longin [8] is visualized in Figure 1. It
contains a meta theory with the following three relations:
– A competence function that relates agents to topics, namely those topics in
which the agent is an expert.
– A subject function that relates propositions to topics, namely those topics
that the propositions are about.
– A scope function that relates actions (such as inform) to topics. Actions
which are affected by the topic of proposition are listed here.
These concepts enable one to formulate principles of belief update. Informally,
they can be expressed as follows:
– If a formula ϕ holds, and an agent is informed about a proposition which
does not share any topic with ϕ, then ϕ persists;








Fig. 1. Conceptual Model of Trust
– If an agent j is competent on a topic and ϕ belongs to that topic, then an
inform by agent j that ϕ implies belief that ϕ.
The first principle is not relevant for this paper, because the BIT logic only
considers the state of the world at one moment. An extension with time is very
interesting, but beyond the scope of this paper. The second principle implies that
if an agent is competent on a proposition ϕ and all topics of proposition ψ are
also topics of ϕ, then the agent is competent on ψ, too. It is the latter issue which
we formalize in the BIT logic, simply replacing belief in competence by trust.
This move disregards the distinction between the two, in the sense that belief in
someone’s competence may lead to trust, but this need not always be the case and
more importantly, trust can be based on other reasons than belief in competence.
Note that both Demolombe and Herzig and Longin take a syntactic approach.
Aboutness A(t,‘p’) and ‘subject’ are relations between formulas and some set
of objects t1, ..., tn called topics with no additional structure. By contrast we
handle topics in the semantics.
4.2 Simulation
In this section we formalize the trust and topic operators, using a technique
called simulation. This means that – typically complex – operators are defined
in terms of standard normal modal operators. For example, the simulation of the
non-normal trust operator in normal modal logic means that the trust operator
is defined using normal operators, but that the operator itself behaves like a
non-normal operator.
The advantages of simulation are twofold. First, the advantage of classical
simulations such as the simulation of various kinds of non-normal modal logics in
[3, 4] is that theorem provers of normal modal logic can be used for proving theo-
rems of non-normal modal logic. This advantage also holds for the simulation of
the non-normal trust operator in normal modal logic. This means, among other
things, that it becomes easier to have a theorem prover test specifications written
in the extended BIT logic. Second, the advantage that motivates the simulation
in this paper is that such a simulation gives us a direct axiomatization of the
logic, which would not be obtained if the operators were only defined semanti-
cally. In that case, additional axioms would have to be given to characterize the
semantic notions.
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Consider the trust operator, which is a non-normal modal operator. This
operator can be simulated using three standard normal modal operators 1ij , 
2
and 3 [4]
Tijϕ ≡ 1ij(2ϕ ∧3¬ϕ)
where ϕ abbreviates ¬¬ϕ as usual.
To understand the reduction remember that truth of Tijϕ in a world w of a
model M means that there is a truth set (neighborhood) S ∈ Tij(w) such that
M,w′ |= ϕ for every w′ ∈ S, and M,w′′ |= ϕ for every w′′ ∈ S. Thus 1ij enables
us to refer to the existence of a truth set (neighborhood), 2 is used to express
the truth of ϕ in S, and 3 expresses the falsehood of ϕ outside S.
4.3 Topic as Enumeration of Options
In this paper, we assume that propositions have topics and that topics are shared
by all agents3. For example, the proposition i(5.0) has financial information as its
topic. Moreover, in the Herzig-Longin approach propositions can belong to two
or more topics, though this does not play a role in the example. Consequently, a
complication of the formalization of topics is that we not only have to state which
topics there are, but that these are all the topics available. It is only by making
explicit all given topics, that we can quantify over topics. For this reason, we
introduce both an operator topic and an operator all topics. We identify a topic
with the set of atomic propositions that have this topic as a subject (see above).
For example, the topic financial information is identified with the set
{i(0.0), . . . , i(10.0), e(0.50), . . . , e(2.00)}
Such a topic set will be represented by a formula like
topic(i(0.0)× . . .× i(10.0)× e(0.50)× . . .× e(2.00))
in which ‘×’ is used to separate alternative options. Our encoding is as follows.
Definition 4 (Topics). The language of BIT with topics is the language of
BIT, together with clause
– if ϕ is a sentence of BIT, then so are 1ϕ, 2ϕ, 3ϕ and 4ϕ.
Moreover, we add the following abbreviations:
– ϕ1 × . . .× ϕn ≡ 2(3ϕ1 ∧4¬ϕ1) ∧ . . . ∧2(3ϕn ∧4¬ϕn) ∧
2((3ϕ1 ∧4¬ϕ1) ∨ . . . ∨ (3ϕn ∧4¬ϕn))
– topic(ϕ1 × . . .× ϕn) ≡ 1(ϕ1 × . . .× ϕn)
– all topics((ϕ1,1 × . . .× ϕ1,n); . . . ; (ϕk,1 × . . .× ϕk,m)) ≡
1((ϕ1,1 × . . .× ϕ1,n) ∨ . . . ∨ (ϕk,1 × . . .× ϕk,m))
– topic contained(ϕ,ψ) ≡ 1(2(3ϕ ∧4¬ϕ) ⊃ 2(3ψ ∧4¬ψ))
3 We assume here that topics are shared by all agents to simplify our presentation.
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The topic notation with × may be read as a representation of a set. That
is, due to the properties of the modal logic we have for example that p × q × r
implies q × p× r or p× p× q × r, but it does not imply for example p× q.
The operator topic represents the set of propositions having the same topic;
all topics states furthermore that these are all topics available, and topic contained
formalizes the fact that all topics of the first element are also a topic of the second
element. In our example topic contained(i(1.0), e(2.00)) holds. In example 2 an
explanation is given. So topic contained(ϕ,ψ) expresses that for every (1) topic,
if formula ϕ has that topic (2(3ϕ ∧ 4¬ϕ)), then formula ψ has that topic
too. It is the latter abbreviation which will be used to formulate a topic-based
trust inference principle.
We assume that topics are treated as axioms, in the sense that they are known
by all agents, and distribute over inform and trust operators. We therefore accept
the following principles:
topic(ϕ1 × . . .× ϕn) ≡ Bitopic(ϕ1 × . . .× ϕn)
topic(ϕ1 × . . .× ϕn) ≡ Iijtopic(ϕ1 × . . .× ϕn)
topic(ϕ1 × . . .× ϕn) ≡ Tijtopic(ϕ1 × . . .× ϕn)
The semantics of BIT with topics extends the semantics of BIT with four
binary accessibility relations that correspond to 1 to 4, that are interpreted
in the usual way. The distribution of topic operators over the BIT modalities is
characterized by the fact that in each world, the relevant accessibility relations
are the same. Due to space limitations we do not give the details.
It may seem that our encoding of the topic operators is rather complicated,
compared to for example [7], but the advantage is that we have a standard seman-
tics. Moreover, an important advantage is that we can use the same methodology
for questions too (see section 5).
4.4 Comparison with Janin and Walukiewicz
The encoding of the topic operator is a further extension of the simulation of
non-normal modal operators mentioned above. This extension can be understood
by analogy to work by Janin and Walukiewicz [9]. They define a → S =def∧
ϕ∈S 
aϕ ∧ a ∨ϕ∈S ϕ, where a is an index of a modal operator and S is
set of formulas [9]. It means that world w satisfies formula a → S when any
formula of S is satisfied by at least one a-successor of w, and all a-successors
of w satisfy at least one formula of S. Classical modal operators are written as
aϕ ≡ a → {ϕ,} and ap ≡ a → {ϕ}∨a → ∅. This is essentially the definition
of bisimulation,4 so the representation reflects the essence of modal logic. As
we indicated above, we use the ×-notation instead of sets, so S = {p, q, r} is
represented by p × q × r. Like sets we have iteration and associativity, i.e., we
can derive for example p × q × q × r. However, also note that if modalities a
and a are normal, then we can derive weakening: (p ∧ q) × r → p × r. Since
4 This insight is attributed to Alexandru Baltag by Yde Venema.
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we do not like this property for topics, we use non-normal modal operators –
to be precise, non-monotonic ones – that do not satisfy weakening. So, in our
reduction of topics, we combine two ideas:
(a) ϕ ≡ 2(3ϕ ∧4¬ϕ) (simulation, as before)
(b) a → S ≡ ∧ϕ∈S aϕ ∧a
∨
ϕ∈S ϕ (Janin and Walukiewicz)
These are combined using the definition of modality 2 according to (b), substitut-
ing (3ϕ∧4¬ϕ) for ϕ and substituting ‘2’ for a, which gives us ∧ϕ∈S 2(3ϕ∧
4¬ϕ)∧2 ∨ϕ∈S(3ϕ∧4¬ϕ), which corresponds to the topic definition above.
Since this only defines one topic, we still have to represent that ”there is a topic”,
for which we use 1.
4.5 Topics and Trust
Now we can formalize the intuition that if a proposition is trusted, then also all
other propositions are trusted which are based on the same topics. We call it
topic-based trust transfer (T3).
1(2(3ϕ ∧4¬ϕ)) ∧ topic contained(ϕ,ψ) ⊃ (Tijϕ ⊃ Tijψ) (T3)
We formalize the running example with topics. Since there is only one topic,
the example is relatively simple.
Example 2. The topic financial information (f) is defined as follows.
f ≡ (i(0.0)× . . .× i(10.0)×e(0.50)× . . .×e(2.00)) topic(f) all topics(f)
In the first treatment of the example, the trust inference was ‘hard coded’. Now,
we use axiom T3 to derive: Tisi(r1)∨Tise(r2) ⊃ (Tisi(r3)∧Tise(r4)). In particular,
from topic(f) we can derive 1(2(3i(r1) ∧ 4¬i(r1))) and from topic(f) and
all topics(f) we can infer topic contained(i(r1), i(r3)). Using axiom T3, we can
infer Tisi(r1) ⊃ Tisi(r3). Similarly, we can infer Tisi(r1) ⊃ Tise(r4) and therefore
Tisi(r1) ∨ Tise(r2) ⊃ Tisi(r3) ∧ Tise(r4). So the property that was postulated in
Example 1, is now derived from our topic construction.
Finally, we note that Liau does not discuss the possibility to add (Tijϕ ∧
Tijψ) ⊃ Tij(ϕ∨ψ), which at first hand looks reasonable, in particular when ϕ and
ψ belong to the same topics. Such an axiom can be formalized with our topics.
Also, by contraposition we can derive topic contained(ϕ,ψ) ⊃ (¬Tijψ ⊃ ¬Tijϕ).
In other words, if all topics of ϕ are a topic of ψ, distrust in ψ transfers to
distrust in ϕ.
5 Questions
In this section, the logic of Liau is extended with questions, because of their
specific relation to trust. Questions have been studied extensively as part of the
semantics of natural language. In this paper we use the semantics of questions
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and answers of Groenendijk and Stokhof [10]. The idea is as follows. Concep-
tually, a question expresses a ‘gap’ in the information of the asker, to be filled
by an answer of the right type. For example, a ‘when’-question asks for a time
or date. So a question specifies what its possible answers are. In the semantics,
that means that a question separates the set of possible worlds into disjoint
subsets, each of which correspond to a complete answer to the question. The
resulting structure is a partition [10]. Technically, a partition is equivalent to an
equivalence relation, called an indistinguishability relation: the agent does not
distinguish between worlds that satisfy the same answer to a question. For a
yes/no question there are two sets of worlds in the partition: worlds that cor-
respond to the answer “yes”, and worlds that correspond to the answer “no”.
For an alternative question like “Which color is the traffic light?”, the partition
corresponds to three possible answers: “red”, “yellow” and “green”. For an open
question like “Who are coming to the party?”, which asks about groups of people
coming to the party, we would get possible answers ranging from “Nobody will
come”, “John will come”, “Mary will come” and “John and Mary will come”,
up to “”Everybody will come”. In other words, open questions are treated as
alternative questions, where each selection from a contextually relevant set cor-
responds to one alternative.
Like in the case of topics, this conceptualization of questions can be en-
coded using the symbol ‘×’ to separate alternatives. We denote a question
by an expression questionij(ϕ1 × . . . × ϕn), where ϕ1...ϕn are the alterna-
tive answers. For example, “Which color is the traffic light?” is encoded by
questionij(‘traffic light is red×traffic light is yellow×traffic light is green). Note
that yes/no questions are a special case of alternative questions.
In some of the trust derivation cases, we need to express the fact that a
possible answer was, either explicitly or implicitly, asked for. We use the Qij-
operator for this. Expression Qijϕ means that agent i has posed a question to
agent j for which ϕ is a possible answer. In other words, Qijϕ holds in case
questionij(ψ1 × ... × ψn) has been explicitly or implicitly posed by agent i to
agent j, for ϕ ≡ ψk and 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Definition 5 (Questions). The language of BIT with topics and questions, is
the language of BIT with topics, together with the following clause:
– if ϕ is a sentence of BIT with topics, then so is ijϕ, for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n.
Moreover, we add the following abbreviations:
– questionij(ϕ1 × . . .× ϕn) = ij(ϕ1 × . . .× ϕn)
– Qijϕ = ij2(3ϕ ∧4¬ϕ)
The definition is analogous to the simulation of topics by a range of normal
modal operators. The semantics of the BIT logic with topics and questions,
extends the semantics of the BIT logic with topics, with a suitable accessibility
relation corresponding to ij . In the semantics ij or equivalently questionij
expresses the existence of a neighborhood corresponding to the answers to a
question from agent i to j. The operators 2 and 3, 4 are again used to
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express the properties of the ×-notation for alternatives. Note that like trust,
but unlike topics, the semantics of questions is made relative to agents i and j.
This expresses the intuition that topics are part of the general logical language,
which is shared by all agents, whereas the questions that have been asked are
particular for specific agents.
In a way, this provides only a minimal semantics. It does not express Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof’s idea of a partition. In case we want to model that answers
to a question must be exclusive, and that the presented answers cover the whole
logical space, i.e., that a question partitions the logical space, then we add the
following axioms:
questionij(ϕ1 × . . .× ϕn) ⊃ (ϕi ∧ ϕj ⊃ ⊥), for all 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n
questionij(ϕ1 × . . .× ϕn) ⊃ (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn ≡ )
5.1 Questions and Trust
The specific relation between questions and trust that we like to formalize in
this section is based on the following intuition. If agent i has deliberately posed
a question to an agent j to which agent i already believes the answer, and agent
j has provided information that corresponds to the initial beliefs of agent i,
then agent i will trust the second agent j. Otherwise, if agent j has provided
the wrong answer, i.e. the information does not correspond to i’s initial beliefs,
then agent i will not trust agent j. This intuition is formalized by the following
axioms which we call question-based trust derivation and question-based distrust
derivation respectively.
(Qijϕ ∧Biϕ ∧BiIijϕ) ⊃ Tijϕ
(Qijϕ ∧Bi¬ϕ ∧BiIijϕ) ⊃ ¬Tijϕ
Here, the combination of Qijϕ and BiIijϕ is meant to express that Iijϕ is a
relevant response of agent j to a question posed by agent i. This reading may
be problematic for a setting in which different questions can be posed, with the
same kinds of answers. For example an answer “at five” may be relevant to both
“When does the bus come?” and ‘When does the train come?”. However, these
problems are not essential for the phenomenon of inferring trust.
Using these axioms, we can formalize our running example.
Example 3. Agent i asks a web-service s the exchange rate: questionis(e(0.50)×
. . . × e(2.00)) which implies Qise(0.50) ∧ . . . ∧ Qise(2.00). If the agent believes
for example that the exchange is 1, Bie(1), and the web-service gives the correct
answer, i.e., BiIise(1), then using the question-based trust creation axiom we
can derive Tise(1). Similarly, in case the agent’s beliefs do not correspond to the
answer, for example Bie(5) and therefore Bi¬e(1) because exchange rates are
unique, we derive ¬Tise(1) by question-based distrust creation.
5.2 Questions and Topics
Questions turn out to be very similar to topics. In the example, the topic ‘fi-
nancial information’ corresponds to a combination of the questions “What is
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the current interest rate?” and “What is the current exchange rate?”. In natu-
ral language semantics, relations between topics and questions have long been
known. Van Kuppevelt [11] even defines topics in terms of the questions that
are currently under discussion. By asking a question, the asker can manipu-
late the current topic of the conversation. As we noted above, topics are the
same for all worlds and all agents. By contrast, we can use Qij to express
the particular ‘questions under discussion’ for agents i and j. Under such an
interpretation, it would make sense that questions were closed under topic:
Qijϕ ∧ topic contained(ϕ,ψ) ⊃ Qijψ. However, under such an implicit ‘ques-
tions under discussion’ interpretation, the question operator cannot be used to
model that an agent explicitly asked for some information. But this is exactly
the interpretation we need in the running example. We therefore use an inter-
mediate step, first using question-based trust creation, and then applying the
topic-based trust transfer principle.
Example 4. We would like to prove the following.
(Bie(r) ∧ questionis(. . .× e(r)× . . .) ∧ Iise(r) ∧
topic contained(e(r), i(r′)) ∧ Iisi(r′)) ⊃ Bii(r′)
Suppose (Bie(r) ∧ questionis(. . . × e(r) × . . .) ∧ Iise(r) ∧
topic contained(e(r), i(r′)) ∧ Iisi(r′)). First, derive Qise(r) by the defini-
tion of Qij , and subsequently Tise(r) by the principle of question-based trust
creation. Second, derive Tisi(r′) from (Tise(r) ∧ topic contained(e(r), i(r′)) by
topic-based trust transfer, and third, derive Bii(r′) from (Iisi(r′) ∧ Tisi(r′))
by Liau’s trust-based belief creation axiom C1. From these three formulas the
desired implication can be obtained by principles of classical logic.
6 Further Research
6.1 Other Communicative Primitives
Suppose communication primitives proposalijϕ and requestijϕ are added to the
logic, to express that agent i received a proposal or request from j. Like an
inform, an agent will only accept a proposal when it trusts the agent’s capabil-
ities. And like a question, a request either indicates trust in the other agent’s
capabilities, or, analogous to our running example, a request is used to test the
agent’s capabilities. Once accepted, a proposal or request expresses a commit-
ment of one of the participants to achieve some future state of affairs. Therefore
we would have to further extend the logic with a ‘see-to-it that’ operator Eiϕ
[12]. In that case, i’s acceptance of a proposal by j can be expressed by an in-
form that i trusts the sender j to achieve the content of the proposal: IjiTijEjϕ.
Similarly, an acceptance of a request, is an inform that the accepter will achieve
the content of the request: IjiEiϕ. Thus in case of a proposal the sender will
act upon acceptance, while in case of a request the receiver will act after having
accepted.
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proposalijϕ ∧ IjiTijEjϕ ⊃ Ejϕ
requestijϕ ∧ IjiEiϕ ⊃ Eiϕ
6.2 Control Procedures
Trust can be based on personal relationships between agents, on past experiences,
or on a reputation that has been passed on by other trusted agents. In the absence
of such direct trust in the other party, an agent has to rely on institutional
control procedures to make sure that other agents will keep their part of the
deal. Examples are banks to guarantee payment, or a bill of lading to guarantee
shipping. However, if an agent does not understand a control mechanism, or does
not trust the institutions that guarantee it, the mechanism is useless. Therefore
one should also model trust in the control procedures. The general idea can be
summarized as follows [1].
Transaction Trust = Party Trust + Control Trust
If we further analyze control trust, it comes down to two aspects. First, the agent
must understand the workings of the control mechanism. For example, agent
i understands that, within a shipment institution s, a bill of lading ‘counts
as’ evidence of the goods having been shipped. A bill of lading is a specific
kind of inform act. In BIT we write Iisbill ⊃ Iisshipped. Second, the agent
must trust the institution s that guarantees the control mechanism. This can be
expressed in BIT too: Tisshipped. Together, these rules implicate, that whenever
the agent receives a bill of lading, it will trust that the goods have been shipped:
Iisbill ⊃ Bishipped. This translation is promising, but rather simplified. Further
relations between Liau’s BIT logic and evidential norms need to be investigated.
7 Related Research
The notion of trust has been studied extensively in the social sciences. For an
overview of research on trust in the context of electronic commerce and multi-
agent systems, see Tan and Thoen [1, 13]. Generally, trust is studied in relation
to a transaction. Mayer et al. give the following definition of trust: “The will-
ingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on
the expectation that the other party will perform a particular action important
to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party
[14]”. Note that risk is involved for the truster. A similar sentiment is found
in the definition by Gambetta “Trust is the subjective probability by which an
individual A expects that another individual B performs a given action on which
its welfare depends” [15]. Both these definitions indicate that trust is subjective,
and directed towards another agent. Trust reflects an interpersonal relation, that
can be generalized to machines. This aspect is nicely reflected in the logic of Liau.
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Aboutness and topicality have received a lot of attention in linguistics. A topic
and its subtopics can be used to identify the structure of a text. For example,
Grosz and Sidner [16] relate the topic of a discourse (also called center or focus of
attention) to the intention that is intended to be conveyed by the author. More
technical research on aboutness is done in the context of information retrieval
[17]. Clearly, in information retrieval it matters under what circumstances we
can say that two documents are “about the same topic”.
A notion that is very similar to trust is found in the so called BAN logics
[18], used to define authentication policies in computer security. Although there
is no explicit notion of trust in these logics, sharing a secret key counts as a proof
of being trusted. The primitives of BAN logic are as follows: i sees X, which
means that agent i received a message containing X. This is similar to Liau’s
inform; j said X, which means that agent j actually sent a message containing
X, and that in case j is to be trusted, X ought to be believed by i; i controls X,
which can be interpreted as saying that agent i is trusted as an authority on X.
This notion might be developed towards our use of topics. In BAN logics it is
often used to represent trusted third parties, like authentication services; fresh
X, which means that X has not been sent previously, and i K←→ j, which means
that agent i and j are entitled to use the same secret key K. Sharing a key
counts as a proof of being trusted. There are several differences between BAN
logics and Liau’s BIT logic and the way they are used. An obvious difference
is the use of keys, which is absent from Liau. Another difference concerns the
perspective: Liau’s logic takes the viewpoint of an individual agent: under what
circumstances can I believe the content of a message? BAN takes the bird’s eye
view of a designer: how should I design my protocol to avoid secrets getting lost?
The underlying logic is also different.
Finally, trust has been studied extensively in the context of a ‘Grid’-like
architecture for the sharing of resources and services [19]. Much of this work is
applied. However, the underlying formal models that are developed in the context
of such research [20] deserve to be compared with the BIT logic proposed here.
Other formalizations in terms of modal logic also exist [21].
8 Conclusion
Trust plays an important role in advanced computer systems such as trust man-
agement systems in computer security [22] and reputation systems as used for
example in eBay [23]. These applications define a much more precise notion of
trust than the notion of trust used in social theories. Moreover, intelligent agents
use trust mechanisms to reason about other agents, for example in cooperation,
coordination, or electronic commerce. Agents that reason about their relations
with other agents, such as agents reasoning about possible cooperation strate-
gies, can benefit from reasoning about trust explicitly. Liau’s logic does not tell
us much about the inner structure of trust, which may even be considered as a
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black box, but it does explain the relation between trust and other concepts, in
particular the relation between trust, belief and information actions.
This paper presents two extensions to Liau’s BIT logic, which allow the
derivation of trust. First, we extend the logic with topics. In this way, we can
express that from trust in the truth of one proposition, we can infer trust in the
truth of other propositions that are related by topic.
Second, we extend the logic with questions. In this way, we can express that
informs are explicitly asked for, or else are implicitly considered relevant by an
agent. There are two kinds of trust inference principles. We might say that by
selecting another agent to ask a question, you indicate that you will trust this
other agent. Thus, questions imply trust. On the other hand, questions may be
asked strategically. In our running example the agent deliberately asked for a
question with a known answer, in order to infer if the replying agent could be
trusted on propositions of a related topic.
A question concerns the applicability of trust principles. We have already seen
two alternative principles regarding trust and questions. It also seems reasonable
to restrict the trust derivation axiom to situations in which the agent is relatively
ignorant. In an examsituation, the teacher knows the answers to all the questionshe
asks. But a correct answer to the first questionwill not necessarilymake the teacher
trust the student about the answers to the remaining questions. This just shows
that the social context in which trust is applied, needs to bemodeled very carefully.
There are several important properties of trust which remain undiscussed.
The logic does not capture the element of risk. In the running example, trusting
the web-service is risky, because the portfolio management of the agent depends
on it. Note that without such a risk, the agent would not go through the trouble
of testing the services with the question about exchange rates.
We briefly indicated how the logic might be further extended with requests
and proposals. This however, would require a shift from an epistemic notion of
trust, about beliefs, to a more practical notion of trust, about actions. We also
discussed how the logic is related to more general transaction models of trust,
which involve control mechanisms guaranteed by an institution. More research
is needed to connect these models with work on institutional norms.
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